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Treatment of Special Bank Interventions  
in Irish Government Statistics
Mary Cussen and Mick Lucey1
Abstract
The financial crisis has led Governments to intervene in a number of ways to 
support and stabilise the banking system. The recording of these interventions 
can be quite complex in statistical terms, as Government accounting rules set 
down for the purposes of the Stability and Growth Pact need to be applied 
consistently and transparently across EU Member States. Our paper firstly 
focuses on Government interventions in the case of Ireland. Since 2008 the 
Irish Government has had to intervene significantly in the banking sector  
and this has had a substantial impact on Irish debt and deficit. In addition,  
the sovereign debt crisis has increased analysts’ requirements for detailed 
information on the impact of these interventions in the banking sector  
on Government debt and deficit and has increased the need for higher 
frequency government statistics. Our paper examines the extent to which 
current Government statistical reporting meets these requirements.
1  The authors are a Senior Economist in the Central Bank of Ireland and a Senior Statistician in the Central Statistics Office.  
The views expressed are solely the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Central Bank of Ireland  
or of the Central Statistics Office. The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Aidan Punch, Joe McNeill,  
Ciaran Judge and Rod O’Mahony. This paper is an updated version of a paper that was presented at the ISI 2011 Congress  
in Dublin on 23rd August 2011.79 Quarterly Bulletin 04 / October 11
1  Introduction
The financial crisis has led many governments 
to intervene to support and stabilise their 
banking systems. These support measures 
have been made in a variety of ways and  
their recording in statistical terms can be 
difficult. This creates problems, especially  
for the Government accounts compiled by 
Member States of the euro area and the wider 
EU. These accounts are used to assess if 
countries comply with the terms of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, so the accounting rules used 
need to be transparent and unambiguous and 
must be applied consistently by all reporting 
countries.
Since September 2008, the Irish Government 
has intervened to support the banking sector in 
a myriad of ways. These interventions, coupled 
with the economic recession which began in 
Q2 2008, led Ireland to record in 2010 the 
highest ever reported deficit in the European 
Union. Section 2 of the paper outlines the 
impact of these interventions on Irish debt  
and deficit and presents an overview of the 
banking support measures introduced by the 
Government. Section 3 shows the impact  
of recapitalisations on the levels of General 
Government deficit and debt. Section 4 
describes how some other interventions  
were treated in Government accounts  
and discusses an important outstanding 
accounting issue relating to the classification  
of publicly-owned ‘bad banks’. The 
sovereign debt crisis has increased analysts’ 
requirements for detailed information on the 
impact of these interventions in the banking 
sector on Government debt and deficit 
and has also increased the need for higher 
frequency Government statistical information. 
Section 5 of the paper examines the extent to 
which current Government statistical reporting 
meets these requirements.
2  The Reaction of the Irish 
Government to the Financial 
Crisis
The deterioration of Irish Government finances 
as a result of the financial crisis and economic 
recession is evident from Charts 1 and 2. 
Ireland’s gross debt is forecasted to rise to  
102 per cent of GDP2 in 2011, assuming there 
are no further debt-increasing capital injections 
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2  The 2011 forecast of Debt to GDP is based on the latest Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) tables of March 2011. The Department 
of Finance will compile an updated set of EDP tables for September 2011. EDP defines debt as gross debt, as opposed to net debt.80 Quarterly Bulletin 04 / October 11
during the year. This marks a substantial 
increase from the pre-crisis, pre-recession 
debt levels of 25 per cent of GDP in 2007. 
Government support to the banking sector 
increased debt by 2.4 per cent of GDP and 
20 per cent of GDP during 2009 and 2010 
respectively, as shown in Chart 1. These 
sharp increases in debt were driven by very 
substantial fiscal deficits from 2008 onwards. 
In 2010, the Irish deficit reached 32 per cent of 
GDP, of which 20 per cent of GDP was due to 
State support to the banking sector.
The financial crisis and general economic 
downturn have had an adverse effect on the 
Government finances for nearly all European 
Union (EU) countries. The debt and deficit of  
all EU countries for the pre-crisis year 2007, 
and also 2010 are presented in Charts 3 and 
4 respectively. The charts show that most 
countries have experienced an increase in  
debt and deficit levels since 2007. The figures 
highlight however, the severity of the crisis on 
Irish Government finances in contrast to other 
EU countries. In 2007, 19 EU countries had 
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higher debt levels than Ireland, and Ireland’s 
surplus of 0.1 per cent of GDP was the 
eleventh highest in the EU. By 2010 however, 
Ireland had the fourth highest debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the EU and had a deficit of 32 per cent 
of GDP, the highest ever recorded in the EU.
The measures taken by the Irish Government 
to stabilise the banking sector are set out  
in Table 1. The first intervention measure  
taken by the Government was to guarantee  
all of the liabilities of the Irish banks on  
30 September 2008, in order to alleviate 
liquidity pressures experienced by the banks 
as a result of the international financial crisis. 
“The initial expectation of officials at the 
time of the guarantee was that none of the 
institutions involved was insolvent, and that 
their problems stemmed mainly from a freezing 
of short-term liquidity in the wake of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers” (Honohan et 
al., 2010). However, it subsequently became 
clear that the banking sector suffered from 
other vulnerabilities. Property-related lending 
as a share of banks’ assets had grown from 
less than 40 per cent before 2002 to over 
60 per cent by 2006 (Honohan, 2009). As 
the recession deepened and property prices 
continued to rapidly decline, it became evident 
that the over-exposure of the banking sector 
to property-related lending was a serious 
problem. In addition, it had been found 
that poor lending practices had prevailed 
during the years preceding the crisis in some 
banks3. Consequently, the Government had 
to intervene to further support the banking 
sector between 2009 and 2011. These 
interventions included the nationalisation 
of three banks, capital injections into five 
banks, the establishment of the National 
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) and the 
restructuring of Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo) and 
Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS). The 
statistical treatment of the capital injections 
and the other measures in Government finance 
statistics are analysed in detail in Sections 3 
and 4, respectively.
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Table 1: Timeline of Irish Government interventions in the banking sector
Date Event Amount % of GDP4
2008 Guarantee of the banking sector €352 bn guaranteed 191.7
2009 Nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank nil nil
2009 Capital injections into BoI (Acquisition of preference shares for cash) €3.5 bn 2.2
2009 Capital injections into AIB (Acquisition of preference shares for cash) €3.5 bn 2.2
2009 Capital injections into Anglo (Acquisition of equity for cash) €4 bn 2.5
2010 NAMA established €28.7 bn guaranteed 18.6
2010 Capital injections into Anglo (Injection of promissory note) €25.3 bn 16.4
2010 Nationalisation of EBS and INBS nil nil
2010 Capital injections into EBS (Acquisition of equity) €0.875 bn 0.6
2010 Capital injections into INBS (Injection of promissory note) €5.4 bn 3.5
2010 Restructuring of Anglo and INBS nil nil
2010 Capital injections into AIB (Acquisition of equity for cash) €3.7 bn 2.4
2011 Capital injections to meet PCAR stress test results5 €17.6 bn 11.2
Source: Internal calculations.
3  The factors contributing towards the Irish banking crisis have been examined in detail in Honohan et al. (2010), Regling and Watson 
(2010) and Nyberg (2011).
4  The % of GDP calculations are calculated by reference to the GDP of each year. These are: €179.99bn for 2008, €160.60bn for 
2009 and €155.99 bn for 2010.
5  The Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) assessed how much additional capital the banks would require under adverse 
scenarios. PCAR is discussed further in Section 3.82 Quarterly Bulletin 04 / October 11
3  The Impact of Recapitalisations 
on Debt and Deficit
Since 2009, the Irish authorities have provided 
the banking sector with capital injections 
amounting to €64 billion, equivalent to  
41 per cent of Irish GDP. These have taken a 
number of different forms including: preference 
shares, ordinary shares and promissory notes. 
This section discusses the treatment of these 
capital injections in the Irish Government finances.
Recapitalisations have a debt-increasing 
impact if they result in additional borrowing. 
They have a deficit-increasing impact if the 
capital injections are considered capital 
transfers because they cannot yield a sufficient 
rate of return in line with EU State Aid rules 
or if the price paid for the shares exceeds 
the market price. In 2009, the State provided 
two Irish banks, Allied Irish Bank and Bank of 
Ireland, with capital injections of €3.5 billion 
each. The injections took the form of 8 per 
cent preference shares. As the shares offered 
a guaranteed rate of return in line with EU 
State Aid rules, they had no deficit impact. The 
State funded €5.8 billion of the capital injection 
through the National Pension Reserve Fund 
(NPRF)6. Consequently, the debt impact of 
the recapitalisations was €1.2 billion. During 
2009, the State also provided Anglo with 
capital of €4 billion. As the Government had 
to borrow to fund this recapitalisation, it had a 
debt increasing impact of €4 billion. Initially, the 
capital injection was treated in the accounts 
as a financial transaction. It was subsequently 
discovered that Anglo would not be able to 
repay the capital injection and the amount was 
reclassified in the 2009 accounts as a deficit-
increasing capital transfer.
Capital injections into the Irish banks in 2010 
totalled €35.275 billion, 23 per cent of Irish 
GDP. The largest capital injections were 
provided to Anglo and INBS. Since 2009, 
these banks have reported massive loan write-
downs and operating losses. Both banks had 
primarily engaged in property-related lending 
in the years preceding the crisis and it has 
since been discovered that these banks had 
inadequate risk procedures (see Nyberg, 
2011). During 2010, capital injections to Anglo 
and INBS totalled €25.3 billion and €5.4 billion, 
respectively. Given the scale of losses reported 
by these banks, the capital injections will be 
unrecoverable by the State and consequently 
were treated as deficit-increasing capital 
transfers in the accounts. The capital injections 
were funded by promissory notes issued by 
the State to Anglo and INBS in lieu of cash. 
These notes will be redeemed over a period 
of several years with the State committed to 
making annual repayments of at least 10 per 
cent of their initial capital value. This phasing 
of payments means the State does not 
require upfront funding for the capital injection. 
However, the promissory notes do impact the 
debt from the date they were issued. In effect, 
the transactions can be viewed as if the capital 
injections were made in cash which was then 
lent back to the Government in return for the 
promissory notes. The capital injections to 
Anglo and INBS, therefore, added 19 per cent 
to both the debt and deficit for 2010.
A feature of the promissory notes issued to 
Anglo and INBS is that the contracts provided 
for an initial grace period of two years during 
which no interest will be charged on the notes. 
A higher rate of interest was chargeable for the 
remainder of the period so that the cumulative 
amount of interest paid over the period of the 
promissory notes remained at an average 
rate sufficient to allow them to be recorded 
on the institutions’ balance sheets at face 
value, notwithstanding the zero rate of interest 
charged in the initial two years.
In the ESA based national accounts, interest is 
usually recorded on a strict accruals basis, but 
the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt 
(MGDD) provides an exception for the recording 
of interest during such grace periods. This 
means that the General Government Deficit 
(GGDeficit) and General Government Debt 
(GGDebt) for Ireland for the years 2011 and 
2012 will not be affected by interest on these 
notes. In subsequent years the full amounts  
of interest chargeable will be recorded on an 
accruals basis and both the deficit and debt 
will be worsened by these amounts.
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It appears that this provision in the MGDD was 
primarily intended for the recording of interest 
holidays on concessionary loans provided 
by Governments and the text in the manual 
is currently being updated to confine the 
application of the rule in future.
Capital injections amounting to €875 million 
were also provided during 2010 to EBS, a 
relatively small Irish building society. These 
increased the deficit by the full amount, while 
debt increased by €250 million, as they were 
partly financed from existing resources. In 
December 2010, AIB received a further capital 
injection of €3.7 billion, which was fully funded 
by the NPRF and therefore did not impact the 
Irish debt. Furthermore, it was treated in the 
accounts as an investment and therefore does 
not directly impact the deficit. The total capital 
injections provided by the State to the banking 
sector since 2009, are summarised above 
in Table 2. The table shows that since 2009, 
capital injections have increased the Irish debt 
and deficit by 25.8 per cent of GDP and 22.5 
per cent of GDP, respectively.
In order to fully ascertain what future capital 
requirements the Irish banks may need, the 
Central Bank performed in-depth stress 
tests in late 2010/early 2011. The tests were 
extremely detailed and assessed what the 
maximum amount of capital required by the 
banks could be under very adverse economic 
conditions. As a result of the tests, the Central 
Bank required banks to increase their capital 
levels. The results showed that the banks 
could require €24 billion. Bank of Ireland’s 
capital requirements were met in part by 
private sector investment in the bank. During 
July 2011, the State provided €17.6 billion to 
the banks to meet the remainder of capital 
requirements outlined in the stress tests. A 
significant proportion of the financing provided 
by the State was met using funds from the 
NPRF. The impact of the capital injections on 
Government debt will depend on the amount 
of new financing which was required. The 
impact on the deficit will depend on whether 
the State will ever receive a return on the 
injections.
4  The impact of other measures 
on debt and deficit
4.1 Guarantee schemes
As shown earlier in Table 1, the initial 
banking support measure provided by the 
Irish Government was the introduction of 
a guarantee scheme covering the liabilities 
of credit institutions which were not already 
covered under the standard retail deposit 
guarantee scheme operated by the Central 
Bank of Ireland. The new scheme called the 
Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme 
(CIFS) was introduced on 30 September 2008, 
for a period of two years. It was a blanket type 
guarantee scheme and covered the existing 
deposits, senior debt, covered bonds and 
dated subordinated debt liabilities of six Irish 
credit institutions. Liabilities covered by the 
scheme initially amounted to €352 billion, 
which was equivalent to almost three times 
the value of Irish GDP. A further, more limited 
guarantee scheme, the Eligible Liabilities 
Guarantee (ELG) Scheme, was introduced in 
December 2009. This covered new deposits 
and eligible debt securities up to a maximum 
maturity of five years which were issued after 
the banks joined the new scheme.
The CIFS scheme expired in September 2010. 
The need for the ELG scheme is reviewed 
every six months and most recently it has 
been extended to the end of 2011. It operates 
alongside the standard Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme run by the Central Bank of Ireland, 
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Table 2: The impact of capital injections on debt and deficit, 2009 – 2010
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which covers 100 per cent of retail deposits 
with all credit institutions authorised in Ireland 
(including credit unions) up to a maximum 
of €100,000 per qualifying depositor per 
institution. This latter scheme has no end-date.
All the above schemes relate to Government 
guarantees on the liabilities of the banking 
sector. The Irish Government has generally not 
provided guarantees on bank assets. However, 
as part of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) facility provided by the Central Bank 
of Ireland, the Government has provided 
guarantees to the Central Bank for certain 
bank assets provided as collateral by the 
banking sector.
Guarantees in National Accounts are treated 
as contingent liabilities and are not recorded 
on balance sheets unless they are absolutely 
certain to be called upon. In Ireland’s case all 
the repayment obligations under the above 
schemes have been met in full, so none of 
the guarantees given to the banks have been 
activated to date. This means the guarantee 
schemes have had no direct impact on the 
levels of Irish gross Government debt. The 
banks covered by the CIFS and ELG schemes 
pay guarantee fees, which in the National 
Accounts are treated as service incomes and 
improve the GGDeficit. However, these fees 
are intended to compensate the Government 
for the additional borrowing costs it incurred 
as a consequence of the extensive guarantees 
provided to the banks. To the extent that 
the guarantee fees simply compensate the 
Government for the extra interest margin it 
pays on its borrowings, the net impact on  
the GGDeficit was envisaged to be neutral.
While guarantees are contingent liabilities  
and are not recorded in the Government 
accounts, information on the levels of 
guarantees outstanding is important for 
assessing the sustainability of the public 
finances. As part of its twice yearly Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP) reporting requirements, 
Eurostat asks Member States to quantify the 
amount of guarantees outstanding in respect 
of the financial crisis. These data are published  
on the Eurostat website and the most recent 
data are summarised in the table above.
4.2 National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA)
In early 2009, the Irish Government decided 
to introduce measures to address concerns 
about asset quality in the Irish banking system. 
The principal uncertainties related to the quality 
of the land and development loans held by the 
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Table 3: Contingent liabilities related to the financial crisis outstanding at end-March 2011
Member State Value (€ billion) % of GDP
Ireland 193 125
Greece 58 25













Euro area (EA17) 602 7
EU27 1,065 9
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credit institutions. In a supplementary budget 
in April 2009, the Government announced 
the establishment of the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA). The Agency 
was to acquire loan assets from the banks  
and to manage and dispose of these 
assets over an extended period of up to ten 
years. The prices paid would be based on 
assessed long-term market values and the 
purchases would be funded by NAMA issuing 
debt securities, 95 per cent of which were 
guaranteed by the Irish Government.
When formally establishing NAMA, the Irish 
authorities were cognisant of the accounting 
guidelines issued by Eurostat on 15 April 
2009, on the statistical recording of public 
interventions to support financial institutions 
and financial markets during the financial crisis. 
These guidelines, which were clarified in a 
further release in September 2009, contained 
a section dealing with the classification of new 
entities established during the financial crisis 
to support the stability of the banking system. 
This issue had arisen specifically in the case 
of the French financial corporation, Société de 
Financement de l’Économie Française (SFEF). 
This company had been established in October 
2008 to provide liquidity funding to French 
banks. SFEF was majority owned by the banks 
but the bonds it issued to raise funds were 
guaranteed by the French Government. As 
a consequence of its guarantee, the French 
State maintained an overall right of veto on the 
operations of SFEF. The Eurostat guidelines 
concluded that, under very restrictive 
conditions, this type of company could be 
classified outside of Government, on the basis 
of its majority private ownership, even though 
its liabilities were guaranteed by Government 
which also exercised ultimate control through 
its veto right.
NAMA, which is classified within General 
Government, was formally established in 
December 2009 and used a SFEF-type 
structure to acquire the problematic loan 
assets from the banks. It established a special 
purpose company called National Asset 
Management Agency Investment Limited 
(NAMAIL), 51 per cent owned by private 
investors and 49 per cent owned by NAMA, 
to acquire the assets. In order to facilitate 
risk-sharing with the banking sector, only 95 
per cent of the securities provided by NAMAIL 
in payment for the assets acquired from the 
banks were guaranteed by the State. The 
remaining 5 per cent was subordinated debt 
repayable only if NAMAIL made a profit. As 
a condition of the State guarantee, NAMA 
maintained a veto over all activities of NAMAIL 
that affected the interests of NAMA or of the 
Irish State.
After an in-depth examination of the structures, 
the Central Statistics Office, with Eurostat’s 
agreement, accepted that, based on the 
published guidelines, the special purpose 
company NAMAIL could be classified in the 
Financial Corporations Sector (S.12), outside of 
General Government. In general, defeasance 
vehicles created by Government to deal 
with impaired assets should be classified in 
the General Government Sector (S.13) so in 
this case the classification of NAMAIL in the 
Financial Corporations Sector (S.12) was on 
the basis of a set of very restrictive conditions. 
These were that the company was majority 
privately owned, was of a temporary duration, 
was created solely to deal with the financial 
crisis and was not expected to incur losses. 
This final condition was especially important 
insofar as the asset values booked in the 
typical defeasance vehicle in other countries 
have often overstated recoverable values so 
that on disposal, the assets have generated 
significant losses. In the case of NAMAIL, the 
loan assets were being acquired at already 
written-down prices and additional safeguards 
were put in place so that in the event of the 
company incurring future losses, these would 
be paid for by the banks.
In line with its mandate, NAMAIL imposed 
very significant haircuts or discounts on the 
loan portfolios it acquired from the banks. By 
the end of 2010, NAMAIL had acquired loan 
assets of a nominal value of over €71 billion 
from five7 participating institutions – Allied Irish 
Bank (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BoI), Anglo Irish 
Bank (Anglo), Irish Nationwide Building Society 
(INBS) and Educational Building Society (EBS). 
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These loans included both performing and 
non-performing loans of the banks’ debtors 
that had significant exposure to the property 
sector. The amounts paid for individual loans 
ranged from 0 to 100 per cent of the book 
value. By end-2010, NAMAIL had in total 
paid €30.2 billion for loans with a nominal 
value of €71.4 billion. This represented an 
average discount of 58 per cent. As shown in 
the following table, the aggregate haircut or 
discount applied to the individual banks ranged 
from 42 per cent to 64 per cent.
By end-March 2011, the nominal value of loans 
acquired had increased to €72.3 billion for 
which a consideration of €30.5 billion had been 
paid. The imposition of such severe haircuts 
meant that losses on the problematic assets of 
the banks were immediately crystallised. This 
in turn created significant capital shortfalls in 
the banks. The result, as described earlier, was 
that the Irish Government was then obliged to 
inject large amounts of capital into the banks in 
order for them to continue to meet their capital 
reserve requirements.
Classification of NAMAIL outside of the General 
Government Sector helped avoid the possibility 
that Irish GGDeficit levels could be artificially 
distorted as a result of loan foreclosures. 
Under the European System of Accounts 
(ESA), which is the legally binding manual 
upon which Government accounts are based, 
the acquisition or disposal of a non-financial 
asset will have an impact on the Government 
deficit. Also in the accounts, the foreclosure of 
collateralised loans are treated as two separate 
transactions, namely (1) the redemption of 
the original loan and (2) the acquisition of the 
underlying collateral (SNA938. Para 12.40).
Most of the problematic loan assets held by 
NAMAIL are secured on physical assets, such 
as land and property. In the event of a default 
by a debtor, NAMAIL forecloses on the loans 
and acquires ownership of the assets provided 
as collateral. To give a simple example9, if 
NAMAIL was included in the Government 
sector and foreclosed on a loan with a nominal 
value of €500 million, for which collateral worth 
€400 million had been provided, the statistical 
treatment in Government accounts would 
be as follows. Prior to foreclosure, NAMAIL’s 
loan asset of €500 million would be written 
down in its balance sheet to €400 million, 
the value of the underlying collateral, using a 
revaluation account which has no impact on 
the Government deficit. The loan foreclosure 
would then be treated as two transactions 
namely (1) the imputed repayment of the 
€400 million loan, which has no impact on 
the deficit, followed by (2) the acquisition of 
the €400 million worth of non-financial assets 
used as collateral which, as mentioned above, 
will impact on the deficit. The net effect in this 
case is that the deficit is therefore worsened 
by €400 million. When NAMAIL sells the non-
financial assets at a later date, it acquires 
cash of €400 million, improving the deficit 
once more. If these transactions took place 
in different years there would have been an 
artificial timing impact, with the GGDeficit 
worsening in the year the assets were acquired 
and improving in the year the assets were sold. 
The scale of loan foreclosures is so large that 
such timing differences could have significantly 
distorted Ireland’s GGDeficit levels if NAMAIL 
had been classified within the Government 
sector.
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Table 4: Details of loans acquired by NAMAIL up to end-December 2010
AIB BoI Anglo INBS EBS Total
Amount paid by NAMAIL (€ bn) 8.4 5.4 12.9 3.0 0.3 30.2
Discount on loans (%) 54% 42% 62% 64% 60% 58%
Implied nominal value of loans (€ bn) 18 9 34 9 1 71
Source: NAMA report & internal calculations.87 Quarterly Bulletin 04 / October 11
An added complication is that the GGDeficit 
would only have been affected if the land and 
property used as collateral were located in 
Ireland. In the ESA based national accounts, 
the ownership of land and property assets 
located in other countries is treated as an 
investment in a notional non-resident unit 
and is therefore considered to be a financial 
asset. This means that if on the foreclosure 
of a loan, the land and property acquired by 
NAMAIL is located overseas, its acquisition is 
treated in the national accounts as a financial 
transaction and would therefore not impact on 
the GGDeficit even if the agency was included 
in Government.
This potential for artificial distortions of the 
GGDeficit was avoided by having NAMAIL 
classified outside of the General Government 
sector. While this was not the criterion used 
for classification, it provides some support for 
the view that the extraordinary nature of the 
financial crisis and its potential for distorting 
underlying trends in the Government finance 
statistics justifies the temporary adaptation of 
some of the ESA95 national accounting rules 
in order to provide more stable statistics for 
EDP purposes.
4.3 Public ownership of banks
By the end of July 2011, the Irish State had 
provided €64 billion of capital to the six Irish 
banks10. These large capital injections mean 
that most of these banks are now owned by 
the State. In January 2009, Anglo was the 
first bank to pass into public ownership. This 
was followed in the middle of 2010 by EBS 
and INBS, and at the end of 2010 by AIB. At 
the start of 2011 the Government announced 
plans for the orderly winding down of both 
Anglo and INBS. Their deposit books have 
since been sold and their other activities 
combined into a single company which will be 
renamed the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation 
(IBRC). This entity will manage and dispose of 
the remaining assets over an extended period 
of up to ten years. This bank cannot enter into 
new business but has maintained a number of 
liened deposits and can issue loans related to 
its existing business customers.
The results of the stress tests for the other four 
domestic banks were published on 31 March 
2011. These indicated that in total these banks 
could require up to €24 billion extra capital to 
satisfy the enhanced capital levels set by the 
Financial Regulator. Bank of Ireland raised part 
of their capital requirement with an investment 
from the private sector. In July 2011, the 
State provided €17.6 billion to the banking 
sector to meet the remainder of their capital 
requirements.
Since the stress tests were completed, 
AIB and EBS have been merged. This 
merged entity, along with BoI and IL&P, 
continue to operate as active banks. These 
three companies are classified as Financial 
Corporations and are excluded from the 
General Government sector.
On the other hand, classification of IBRC 
has proved somewhat more problematic. 
The Manual on Government Deficit and Debt 
(MGDD) states that publicly-owned financial 
defeasance companies that are newly 
established to manage impaired assets should 
be included in the General Government sector 
if the Government is at risk for losses that 
might be incurred on the assets in the future. 
During the financial crisis, existing public banks 
have been restructured in different ways and, 
in some cases, what now remains appears 
to have more of the features of a defeasance 
vehicle than an active credit institution.
In an effort to ensure a harmonised treatment 
of these entities by EU Member States, 
Eurostat issued guidelines in March 2011 for 
classifying publicly-owned banks. The basic 
principle to be applied was that when publicly-
owned banks which managed impaired assets 
were restructured and were no longer actively 
performing as banks, they should be treated 
as defeasance structures and reclassified 
to the General Government sector. These 
guidelines were applied for the first time in 
the EDP reports at the end of March 2011. 
In practice, the guidelines were interpreted 
by Eurostat to mean that entities that were 
on the list of Monetary Financial Institutions 
(MFIs) maintained by the European Central 
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Bank should continue to be treated as credit 
institutions and remain classified outside of 
General Government. This is in line with the 
accounting rules specified in Paragraphs 2.41 
and 2.49 of the European System of Accounts 
(ESA95).
However, this interpretation of the guidelines 
meant that entities that were in many respects 
very similar were classified differently in the 
Government accounts at end-March 2011. In 
Ireland’s case, Anglo had retained its banking 
licence and continued to be included on 
the MFI list, so it remained classified in the 
Financial Corporation sector (S.12). However, 
in the UK, Northern Rock had been split into 
a good bank and a bad bank, and the latter 
no longer had a banking licence and was 
reclassified into the General Government 
sector (S.13). To ensure transparency, 
Eurostat, when publishing the results of the 
March 2011 EDP reports, included a paper11 
which described the classification of those 
publicly-owned banks in Member States that 
were considered borderline cases.
The classification of a bank inside or outside 
of General Government can have a very 
significant impact on the levels of GGDebt 
which are measured in the EDP reports. The 
definition of debt used for EDP purposes 
is gross debt. If a ‘bad bank’ is reclassified 
into the General Government sector, its loan 
liabilities become part of the GGDebt and even 
though it may hold assets of a comparable 
value, these cannot be netted from the 
GGDebt reported in the EDP tables.
The classification criterion based on the MFI 
list is specifically established in the ESA95 
and cannot be ignored. In addition, one 
consequence of having a full banking licence 
is the requirement to maintain an adequate 
amount of capital reserves. The capital injected 
by the Irish Government is sufficient to ensure 
that the requisite levels of reserves are held, 
and this is deemed sufficient to absorb any 
future losses. Notwithstanding this, there 
continues to be official discussions on the 
best way of dealing in practice with borderline 
cases. However, as an overall principle, the 
ESA favours a recording of transactions based 
on the economic reality rather than on legal 
form, so in some respects the holding of a 
banking licence and inclusion on the MFI 
list may not be an appropriate classification 
criterion.
5  The Financial Crisis and 
User Government Data 
Requirements
As described in the previous sections, the 
interventions carried out by Governments in 
the banking sector as a result of the financial 
crisis have led to enormous challenges for 
statisticians in terms of statistical recording. 
The financial turmoil and sovereign debt crisis 
however, mean that statisticians also face 
challenges in terms of users’ requirements. 
Users of Government statistics require 
transparent information on the treatment in 
Government accounts of interventions in 
the banking sector, as well as Government’s 
off-balance sheet exposures. Moreover, the 
financial turmoil and sovereign crisis mean 
that users need more timely debt and deficit 
statistics. This section explores how current 
Government statistics meet these challenges.
Since October 2009, Member States 
are required to provide Eurostat with a 
supplementary table on the treatment in 
the statistics of Government interventions 
resulting from the financial crisis from 2007 
onwards. These tables are publicly available 
on Eurostat’s website and inform users of 
the impact of the financial crisis on debt 
and deficit, as well as off-balance sheet 
Government guarantees. Eurostat further 
increased the transparency of the impact of 
the crisis on Government finance statistics 
by publishing a note on the supplementary 
tables in April 2011, including details of the 
classification of publicly-owned financial 
institutions. The supplementary tables provide 
a transparent guide to the treatment of 
government interventions in the accounts. 
There are two caveats to the tables however,  
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in terms of timeliness and frequency. The 
tables are updated by countries bi-annually  
as part of the EDP reporting at t+3 months  
and t+9 months. This means that the tables 
are not always up-to-date with the latest 
impact of Government interventions on the 
statistics.
In the current economic environment,  
users require timely statistical information  
on Government finances. Currently, 
Member States are obliged to compile all 
government finance statistics at t+90 days. 
Under the forthcoming amendment of the 
EU Commission regulations governing this 
transmission however, there is scope for 
Member States to reduce the number of  
days at which they must provide Government 
statistics. While timelier data is of course 
desirable from the end-user’s point of view,  
the potential impact this may have on quality 
must also be considered. Furthermore, there 
is a clear need for consistent treatment of 
relatively similar support measures across 
countries. The existing Eurostat proposals for 
re-routing assets and liabilities of bad banks 
through Government may enhance consistency, 
though major challenges remain for statisticians 
with regard to the issue of the valuation of 
impaired or illiquid assets.
6  Conclusion
Over the past three years, Government 
finances across the EU have undergone rapid 
change. All countries have seen their debt and 
deficit increase from 2007 levels. In addition, 
20 of the 27 Member States have intervened 
to support the banking sector. It is clear 
however, that the impact of the financial crisis 
has not been homogenous across countries. 
In Ireland, fiscal imbalances resulting from the 
recession and the overexposure of Irish banks 
to the property market has meant that the 
support measures taken have been far more 
wide ranging and costlier than in other Member 
States. These have included guaranteeing 
the Irish banking sector, nationalising and 
restructuring distressed banks, creating 
an entity to manage impaired assets, and 
providing capital injections which so far 
total nearly 30 per cent of GDP. Our paper 
analyses the treatment of these measures in 
Government accounts. It shows that these 
interventions have increased debt by 5.3 per 
cent of GDP and 20.5 per cent of GDP for 
2009 and 2010, respectively. In addition, the 
deficit was worsened by 2.5 per cent of GDP 
in 2009 and 20 per cent of GDP in 2010. The 
paper also highlights the ongoing issues at 
EU level to develop a framework to record all 
the diverse Government support measures 
for the financial sector, within a harmonised 
framework.
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ANNEX: Example of the recording of a loan foreclosure
After debtor default, NAMAIL forecloses on a loan of nominal value of €500 million which is backed 
by collateral in the form of property assets valued at €400 million. NAMAIL sells the property assets 
the following year also for €400 million.
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Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
AF.4 Loans 500 AF.4 Loans 500
Balance sheet adjustment prior to foreclosure
Revaluation Account
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
AF.4 Loans -100 AF.4 Loans -100
Adjusted Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
AF.4 Loans 400 AF.4 Loans 400
Recording of foreclosure
Capital Account
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Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
AN.11 Fixed 
assets 40092 Quarterly Bulletin 04 / October 11
The codes used in the above accounting example are described in the European System of 
Accounts (ESA95) Manual. B.9 Net lending(+)/borrowing(-) of the General Government sector 
corresponds to the General Government Deficit/Surplus. In the above example, if NAMAIL was 
included in the General Government sector, the GGDeficit would be worsened by €400 million in 
year 1 and improved by the same amount in year 2.
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